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The Empagran Exception:  Between Illinois Brick and a Hard Place 
 
Victor P. Goldberg 
 
Before it was uncovered and prosecuted, the international vitamin cartel, known as “Vi-
tamins, Inc.” by its perpetrators, was extraordinarily successful.  Estimates of cartel prof-
its ran as high as $18 billion (in 2003 dollars).1  In addition to substantial criminal sanc-
tions, cartel members paid over $2 billion to American plaintiffs.2 When foreign plaintiffs 
tried to sue the foreign defendants in American courts, however, they encountered resis-
tance.3  A trial court read the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (“FTAIA”) to 
restrict the reach of the Sherman Act and preclude the foreigners from suing foreigners.4  
The D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that the facts brought the case within FTAIA’s excep-
tions.5  There already being a circuit split with the Second Circuit allowing a suit6 and the 
Fifth Circuit dismissing one for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,7 the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.  In its unanimous decision, the Court ruled that the FTAIA exception 
did not apply where a claim rested solely on foreign harm that was independent of any 
adverse domestic affect.8 
 
The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 excludes most anti-competitive 
foreign trade and commercial activity from the Sherman Act’s reach.9  However, the 
FTAIA also contains exceptions to this general rule, using language that is less than 
clear: 
 
[The Sherman Act] shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other 
than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless— 
                                                 
1 Brief of Certain Professors of Economics as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 10, 
F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 524 U.S. 145 (No. 03-724) (hereinafter Economists Brief).  
For the story of the vitamin cartel, see David Barboza, Tearing Down The Facade of ‘Vitamins Inc.’, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 10, 1999, at C1. 
2 Amici for the defendants reckoned the total financial antitrust fines and penalties imposed on the cartel as 
between $4.4 and $5.6 billion. Brief Amici Curiae of Professors Darren Bush et al. in Support of Respon-
dents, note 5, at 15, Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (No. 03-724), 2004 WL 533933. 
 
3 Plaintiffs included five foreign vitamin distributors located in Ukraine, Australia, Ecuador, and 
Panama. 
4 Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., No. Civ.001686TFH, 2001 WL 761360, at *4 
(D.D.C. June 7, 2001). 
5 Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 350 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
6 Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002). 
7 Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2001). 
8 F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 159 (2004).  Justice O’Connor did 
not participate; Justice Scalia filed a very short concurring opinion in which Justice Thomas joined. 
9 Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1246 (1982). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1338291
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(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect— 
 
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign na-
tons, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations . . . and 
 
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of [the Sherman Act]. 
 
The Court interpreted the FTAIA as barring the foreign plaintiffs’ suit. However, it re-
manded the case for consideration of plaintiff’s alternative theory that the foreign injury 
was not independent of the adverse domestic effect. The Supreme Court thereby left fu-
ture foreign plaintiffs with some wiggle room, but little guidance.10  The alternative the-
ory was also rejected on remand.11  Subsequent plaintiffs have fared similarly, with only 
one reported decision of a suit (involving price fixing of computer components) surviving 
a motion to dismiss.12  Even if a cartel’s domestic price-fixing could only be sustained if 
it operated both domestically and abroad, that would not be sufficient to allow foreign 
plaintiffs to sue foreign sellers in the U.S.. 
 
If not then, are there any circumstances that would fall within the FTAIA exception? In 
this article, I identify one narrow class of cases that would satisfy the statutory exception. 
Rather than focusing on the interrelatedness of the foreign and domestic prices, the in-
quiry centers on the resale of goods to the domestic market.  The argument, raised by Jus-
tice Scalia at oral argument, is a variant on Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court’s landmark 
ruling rejecting a passing-on theory of injury suffered by indirect purchasers.13  Before 
developing this argument in Section II, I first briefly detail the Empagran decisions. 
 
 
I. Empagran and the FTAIA 
 
During the Empagran litigation, it was undisputed that the domestic and foreign vitamin 
markets were interrelated.14  Vitamins, Inc. could not operate solely within the U.S. while 
leaving foreign markets competitive.  Nor could it cartelize foreign markets alone.15  Be-
                                                 
10 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 175. 
11 Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd., 417 F.3d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
12 Sun Microsystems Inc v. Hynix Semiconductor Inc., 534 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
13 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
14 At oral argument, plaintiff’s counsel asserted: “Now, the reason our position is critical is the one identi-
fied by Justice Kennedy, and that is that the conspirators' cartel encompassed a worldwide market for bulk 
vitamins and the worldwide market is relevant because geographic boundaries don't have any meaning 
here. A conspiracy limited to U.S. commerce would have collapsed as U.S. purchasers bought abroad, as 
Justice Scalia has said.”  Oral Argument at 19, F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 
(2004) (No. 03-724). 2004 WL 1047902 (U.S.), 41 USLW 3686. 
15 Like love and marriage or a horse and carriage, you can’t have one without the other.  See 
Sammy Cahn and Jimmy Van Heusen, “Love and Marriage” (1958). 
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cause of the minimal transportation cost, low trade barriers, and fungibility of vitamins, a 
single market for these goods emerged; had the conspiracy been confined to a single geo-
graphic submarket, it would have been doomed by arbitrage.  The plaintiffs argued, and 
D.C. Circuit on its initial hearing of the case, agreed that this interrelationship was suffi-
cient to bring the cartel within the FTAIA exception.  The conspiracy itself had (1) “a 
direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on domestic competition and (2) 
this effect (the injured domestic customer) “[gave] rise to” a Sherman Act claim. 
 
Although the Supreme Court accepted the interrelationship argument, its framing of the 
issue made clear that this was insufficient to find an FTAIA exception.  “The price-fixing 
conduct significantly and adversely affects both customers outside the United States and 
customers within the United States, but the adverse foreign effect is independent of any 
adverse domestic effect.  In these circumstances, we find that the FTAIA exception does 
not apply (and thus the Sherman Act does not apply).”16  The Court’s primary justifica-
tion for this conclusion was prescriptive comity, a rule of construction that “cautions 
courts to assume that legislators take account of the legitimate sovereign interests of other 
nations when they write American laws.”17  Thus, American law should not be read to 
supplant the laws of Canada, Japan and other sovereign states when they are better able to 
protect their domestic customers from anticompetitive conduct.18  When the plaintiffs 
countered that there could be no conflict of law because all governments agreed that na-
ked price fixing was bad, the Court was unpersuaded.  “[S]everal foreign nations have 
filed briefs here arguing that to apply our remedies would unjustifiably permit their citi-
zens to bypass their own less generous remedial schemes, thereby upsetting a balance of 
competing considerations that their own domestic antitrust laws embody.”19 
 
Plaintiffs enlisted a gaggle of economists to argue that allowing only domestic victims to 
file suit against an international cartel with a worldwide market would result in under-
deterrence.20  Defendants did not address this argument directly, instead stressing that the 
deterrence mix is multifaceted and includes American private treble damages suits, 
American criminal prosecutions, and foreign enforcement actions.21  The defendants and 
                                                 
16 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 64 (emphasis added). 
17 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 164-65.  The majority’s second argument was based on its understand-
ing of the legislative history of the FTAIA.  See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 162-63. 
18 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 165.  Amicus Briefs were filed on behalf of the defendants by seven for-
eign governments including Germany, Belgium, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, Ireland and the 
Netherlands. 
19 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 167.  These nations’ remedies varied widely, with American treble dam-
ages plus attorney fees falling near the top of the remedial scale. 
20 See Economists Brief; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Economists Joseph E. Stiglitz and Peter R. 
Orszag in Support of Respondents; see also Brief Amici Curiae of Professors Darren Bush et al. in Support 
of Respondents, F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 524 U.S. 145 (No. 03-724). 
21 Alternatively, if under-deterrence were indeed a concern, Congress could address this without 
permitting foreign claims by boosting penalties in the two domestic categories. 
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several amici22 argued, somewhat counter-intuitively, that increasing potential liability by 
permitting foreign plaintiffs to sue could actually reduce deterrence.  Because an impor-
tant element of the Department of Justice’s antitrust detection strategy is amnesty, a cartel 
member could see a reduction or elimination of its public penalty in return for cooperat-
ing with law enforcement officials.23  The benefits of cooperation, however, are reduced 
as exposure to private damages increases.  Broadening civil exposure to include foreign 
plaintiffs, the defendants argued, would undermine the amnesty program and weaken de-
terrence.  The Court acknowledged the disagreement, but declined to choose sides.24 
 
Not surprisingly, nations disagree as to the appropriate level of deterrence for anticom-
petitive activities.  For international cartels, however, the policies of one nation will af-
fect the policies of other affected nations.  No country can determine the level of deter-
rence unilaterally.  As the Court observed: 
 
No one denies that America’s antitrust laws, when applied to foreign conduct, can 
interfere with a foreign nation’s ability independently to regulate its own com-
mercial affairs.  But our courts have long held that application of our antitrust 
laws to foreign anticompetitive conduct is nonetheless reasonable, and hence con-
sistent with principles of prescriptive comity, insofar as they reflect a legislative 
effort to redress domestic antitrust injury that foreign anticompetitive conduct has 
caused.25 
 
However, the Court concluded, it would not be “reasonable to apply those laws to foreign 
conduct insofar as that conduct causes independent foreign harm and that foreign harm 
                                                 
22 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners; See also CITE [foreign 
countries]. 
23 At oral argument, R. Hewitt Pate, Asst. Att’y Gen., as amicus curae in support of petitioners tes-
tified, “[g]iven the key role of deterrence, both in the opinion below and in the respondents’ arguments 
here, the United States thinks it important to offer the Court an accurate understanding of how international 
cartel enforcement really works.  It's only in the past 8 years that we’ve begun to see dramatic success in 
detecting and punishing international cartels, and that has come about only by international cooperation 
with other enforcement agencies and through the use of amnesty programs.”  Transcript of oral Argument 
at 17, Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (No. 03-724). 
24 “[R]espondents point to policy considerations, namely, that application of the Sherman 
Act in present circumstances will (through increased deterrence) help protect Americans 
against foreign-caused anticompetitive injury.  Petitioners, however, have made impor-
tant experience-backed arguments (based upon amnesty-seeking incentives) to the con-
trary.  We cannot say whether, on balance, respondents’ side of this empirically based ar-
gument or the enforcement agencies’ side is correct.” 
Empagran, 542 U.S. at 174.  Congress recently enacted legislation limiting the damage remedy to single 
damages for those granted amnesty.  Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 
108-237, 118 Stat. 665 (2004).  The European Commission has also recommended limiting damages for 
firms applying for leniency.  Commission of the European Communities, White Paper on Damages for 
Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, (2008). 
25 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 165. 
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alone gives rise to the plaintiff's claim.”26  When the adverse foreign effect is “independ-
ent of any adverse domestic effect,” the FTAIA would bar the plaintiffs.27  Although the 
Court in Empagran determined that the foreign effect of Vitamins, Inc. was independent 
of its domestic effect, removing the plaintiffs’ claim from FTAIA’s limited exception 
(and thus from the Sherman Act as well), a ray of hope remained.  On appeal before the 
D.C. Circuit, the plaintiffs had presented two theories of their case, only one of which 
was addressed by the Court of Appeals.28  For this reason, the Supreme Court remanded 
so that the plaintiffs could present their alternative theory: 
 
Respondents contend that, because vitamins are fungible and readily transport-
able, without an adverse domestic effect (i.e., higher prices in the United States), 
the sellers could not have maintained their international price-fixing arrangement 
and respondents would not have suffered their foreign injury.  They add that this 
“but for” condition is sufficient to bring the price-fixing conduct within the scope 
of the FTAIA’s exception.29 
 
Instead of simply stating that for the cartel to succeed, prices would have to be fixed in 
both the foreign and domestic markets, plaintiffs argued that high domestic prices caused 
foreign prices to be high, thereby causing antitrust injury.  On remand, the Court of Ap-
peals rejected this argument, concluding that “but for” causation was insufficient.  The 
domestic injury needed to be a proximate cause of the foreign plaintiffs’ injury.  “The 
statutory language—‘gives rise to’—indicates a direct causal relationship, that is, proxi-
mate causation, and is not satisfied by the mere but-for ‘nexus’”.30 
 
The strained causality argument was a response to the Supreme Court’s rejection of the 
notion that the interrelation of the foreign and domestic markets would be enough for the 
plaintiffs to prevail.31  The “but for” versus “proximate” cause characterization doesn’t 
really help.   As Judge Noonan observed in a concurring opinion post-Empagran, “[w]e 
reach this . . . point not from guidance in words like ‘proximate’ or ‘direct’ but from a 
strong sense that the protection of consumers in another country is normally the business 
of that country.  Location, not logic, keeps [Plaintiff’s] claim out of court.”32 
 
The simple economic point is that for the Vitamins, Inc. conspirators to maintain a cartel 
                                                 
26 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 165 (emphasis in original). 
27 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 164. 
28 “In light of our disposition in favor of appellant on other grounds, we find it unnecessary to ad-
dress this ‘alternative’ theory of subject matter jurisdiction.”  Empagran, 315 F.3d at 341. 
29 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 175. 
30 Empagran, 417 F.3d at 1271. 
31 Plaintiffs felt precluded form making a more natural causation argument: high foreign prices caused, or 
at least enabled, domestic prices to be high. 
32 In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litigation, 538 F.3d 1007, 1116-17 
(9th Cir. 2008). 
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price anywhere, they had to maintain it everywhere.  Domestic price-fixing, without 
more, would not cause foreign injuries; likewise, foreign price-fixing, without more, 
would not cause domestic injuries.  The Empagran plaintiffs sought to argue the domestic 
price-fixing had a substantial effect on domestic competition (true), gave rise to an anti-
trust claim (also true) and therefore the foreign plaintiffs could sue.  On remand, the 
Court of Appeals found that the causation was indirect.  “It was the foreign effects of 
price-fixing outside of the United States that directly caused, or ‘g[a]ve rise to,’ their 
losses when they purchased vitamins abroad at super-competitive prices.”33  Therefore, 
the court concluded, the plaintiffs “[did] not establish . . . that the U.S. effects of the ap-
pellees’ conduct—i.e., increased prices in the United States—proximately caused the for-
eign appellants’ injuries.”34 
 
 
II. What’s Illinois Brick Got To Do With It? 
 
Under federal law, if cartel member X sells to Y who then resells to Z, the direct pur-
chaser (Y) can sue under the Sherman Act, but the indirect purchaser (Z) cannot.  So de-
cided the Supreme Court in Hanover Shoe35 and Illinois Brick.36  The direct purchaser 
can sue for the entire overcharge, regardless of whether it “passed on” any or all of it 
(Hanover Shoe) and the indirect purchaser cannot sue (Illinois Brick).  A majority of 
states have adopted Illinois Brick repealers that permit suits by indirect purchasers.37  At 
the federal level, there has been some movement to overrule Illinois Brick.38  Given the 
inherent difficulty of determining the incidence of an overcharge, the federal bar against 
indirect purchasers’ suits is appropriate.  In any event, the Illinois Brick rule was in place 
when Empagran was decided and remains the law. 
 
During oral argument in Empagran, Justice Scalia raised Illinois Brick.  In his question-
ing of respondent’s counsel he suggested the test proposed here: 
 
I would think your defense against that is . . . not to assert that there's no 
effect on . . . foreign commerce, on our exports, because  . . . I think there 
is. . . . I would think your defense is . . . in Section 2 of the Foreign Trade 
Antitrust Improvements Act, which requires that this effect on commerce, 
                                                 
33 Empagran, 417 F.3d at 1271. 
34 Empagran, 417 F.3d at 1271. 
35 Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 392 U.S. 481 (1968). 
36 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
37 “At the present, more than thirty-five states permit indirect, as well as direct, purchasers to sue for dam-
ages under state law” Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report And Recommendations 266 (2007).  
  
38 Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report And Recommendations 266 (2007).  For criticism 
of the recommendation, see William H. Page, Class Interpleader: The Antitrust Modernization Commis-
sion’s Recommendation to Overrule Illinois Brick Manuscript, June 17, 2008. 
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on export commerce, gives rise to a claim under the provisions of Sections 
1 to 7, and . . .  the only way it gives rise to a claim on the part of these 
people is a claim as second purchasers, and Illinois Brick would have ex-
cluded their claim, I assume, if they are re-buying  . . . from people in the 
United States. Wouldn't that be the case?39 
 
He raised Illinois Brick again when questioning one of the plaintiff’s variations on the 
arbitrage/one market theme.  Plaintiff argued that if there had not been price fixing in the 
United States, the foreign buyers would have purchased from the Americans at a lower 
price: 
[I]t seems extraordinary to me that if . . . a foreign company had been injured by 
buying drugs from an American company that bought them from the conspirators 
at an excessively high price, that foreign company would not have a cause of ac-
tion.  But you’re saying that a foreign company has a cause of action by reason of 
the fact that had the American company not purchased at the artificially high con-
spiratorial price, but at a lower price, they might have purchased . . . from that in-
termediate person, . . . whereas Illinois Brick would clearly bar the first suit, 
you're saying it doesn’t bar the second suit as a rationale for allowing them to sue 
here, and that strikes me as very strange.40 
 
Neither the Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals on remand followed up on Justice 
Scalia’s argument.   Illinois Brick is mentioned in neither decision.  Nonetheless, I be-
lieve that it is the key to finding at least one class of cases that would fall within the ex-
ception.  To be clear, it is not that Illinois Brick provides the rationale; rather its role as a 
bar to certain domestic claimants is what matters.  The FTAIA exception fills a void left 
by Illinois Brick when the direct purchaser is a foreign entity. 
 
Suppose that we change the X-Y-Z hypothetical by adding a geographic component.  A 
foreign conspirator X sells vitamins to distributor Y who then sells those same vitamins 
to domestic customer Z.  As before, Illinois Brick would preclude a suit by the indirect 
purchaser (Z).  But what about Y, the direct purchaser?  If Y were a domestic firm, Illi-
nois Brick would clearly allow the suit.  But what if Y were a foreign firm?  There are 
three possibilities: (1) bar the foreign suit so that X is liable to neither Y nor Z; (2) main-
tain the foreign bar while carving an exception to Illinois Brick that allows Z to sue 
whenever the direct purchaser is barred from doing so (in general or specifically when the 
direct purchaser is a foreign entity), or (3) keep Illinois Brick intact and allow Y to sue.  
The last option is a natural reading of the FTAIA exception: the effect on domestic com-
merce (Z) is direct and reasonably foreseeable (more on “substantial” below) and the ef-
fect itself (an elevated domestic price) gives rise to a Sherman Act claim. 
 
Suppose we add another step to the X-Y-Z hypothetical.  Instead of selling vitamins di-
rectly to U.S. customers, the direct purchaser (Y) adds the vitamins to pig feed and ulti-
                                                 
39 Oral Argument at 8, F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724). 
2004 WL 1047902 (U.S.), 41 USLW 3686 
40 Oral Argument at 35. 
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mately exports the pork to the United States.41 Suppose further that the price of vitamins 
is an insignificant contributor to the cost of American pork and that the exported quantity 
is too small to influence the American pork market.  Thus, the impact of the overcharged 
vitamins would be confined to the economic rents of foreign producers.  Could Y sue to 
recover the overcharge?  It seems clear that this claim would falter before both clauses of 
the FTAIA exception.  The conspiratorial overcharging might have a direct effect on 
some markets, but the effect on domestic markets would remain insubstantial (Clause 1).  
Since domestic pork prices would not be affected, the overcharge would not give rise to a 
Sherman Act claim (Clause 2).  There are intermediate cases.  Suppose instead that Y re-
packaged the vitamins and that the value added was ten percent.  That could possibly pass 
the substantiality test.  Where precisely the line should be drawn is something that courts 
would have to work out. 
 
The FTAIA’s concern with “substantial” effects modifies the Illinois Brick rule when the 
direct purchaser is a foreign firm.  If the direct purchaser were a domestic firm, the ulti-
mate effect on final users would be irrelevant. .  Under Hanover Shoe, even if there were 
no impact on final users, a domestic direct purchaser could recover the entire overcharge 
(trebled).  If the direct purchaser were foreign, however, liability would turn on the like-
lihood that the overcharge would be passed on to domestic customers as well as its mag-
nitude. 
 
One might argue that only the portion of the overcharge passed on to domestic customers 
should be included in a damages award, but this would recreate the very obstacles Illinois 
Brick allowed us to avoid.  I propose a new interpretation of the FTAIA exception that 
incorporates a concern for international comity while eliminating the inherent difficulty 
of determining the incidence of an overcharge.  This approach entails a two-step process 
in which liability is determined before damages are calculated.  The “passing on” ques-
tion arises only at the first stage, determining liability: Was it likely that there would be a 
discernible effect on the domestic market (substantiality)?  Only if the claim passed this 
hurdle would a court proceed to the damages stage.  Here, the foreign direct purchaser, 
like its domestic counterpart, would recover the full overcharge, but limited to the over-
charge on goods actually sold into the United States.  If the foreign direct purchaser re-
sold 20 percent of its purchased vitamins to the United States, it could recover the over-
charge on those goods.  The overcharge on the remaining 80 percent would not provide 
the basis for recovery since the effect on domestic commerce by the sale of those goods 
would be indirect and therefore barred.  
 
This narrow exception is consistent with the FTAIA and the Supreme Court’s interest in 
international comity.  Foreign entities can sue only if the effect on the domestic price was 
direct and substantial—that is, only if a significant portion of the price increase was 
passed on to the domestic customers.  For the most part, the interests of the foreign coun-
tries in maintaining their own remedy structures would be honored.  Liability would be 
limited to the case in which the foreign sale resulted directly in a higher price to the even-
tual domestic customer. 
 
                                                 
41 One of the Empagran plaintiffs was the Winddridge Pig Farm of Australia. Oral Argument at 7.  
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To illustrate the inquiry and limited nature of the exception I propose, consider Den 
Norsk, one of the two opinions causing the pre-Empagran circuit split.42  The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Empagran ratified the rejection of Den Norsk’s claim, though for rea-
sons unrelated to the approach suggested here.  Den Norsk, a Norwegian oil firm, sued 
providers of heavy-lift barge services who had conspired to suppress and eliminate com-
petition by rigging bids and allocating customers and territories.  There were only six or 
seven such barges in the world, so there was clearly a global market.  As in Empagran, 
the court recognized that the price paid by the foreign plaintiff was inflated, but that fact 
alone did not give rise to liability. 
 
The plaintiffs argued that the barges were an input in their production of offshore oil and 
that they sold a considerable amount of oil to the United States (roughly 400,000 barrels 
per day).  The conspiracy, they claimed, “compelled Americans to pay supra-competitive 
prices for oil.”43  Under the approach suggested here, the first stage of the inquiry asks 
whether the overcharge for Norwegian barge services substantially impacted U.S. oil 
prices.  If so, the second stage would determine damages based on the overcharge for 
barge services, not for the amount passed on to American consumers by inflated domestic 
oil prices.  Further, the overcharge would be assessed not for all the barge services, but 
only for that fraction equal to the portion of the oil sold by the plaintiff into the United 
States.  In Den Norsk, the numerator would be 400,000 barrels per day (the decision does 
not provide information on the denominator). 
 
Would Den Norsk’s claim survive the first step?  Almost certainly not.  Norwegian oil 
production forms but a sliver of the international oil market.  Any increase in the cost of 
producing Norwegian oil is unlikely to have a substantial impact on international oil 
prices generally and, therefore, U.S. domestic prices in particular.  The effect would fall 
almost entirely on Norwegian economic rents.  A court should hold that the claim fails to 
clear the first hurdle.   
 
Under the suggested approach, Den Norsk’s claim would be dismissed from a U.S. court 
for want of a substantial effect on domestic commerce or trade.  If, on the other hand, the 
effect were substantial, damages would be proportional to Den Norsk’s sales into the 
United States.  In either case, Den Norsk would have recourse against the conspiratorial 
barge companies in Norwegian (or other foreign) courts for the impact on non-U.S. mar-
kets. 
 
III. Concluding Remarks 
 
There are a number of markets like the vitamin market in which domestic and interna-
tional markets are tightly linked by arbitrage.  An international cartel could not success-
fully fix prices in the domestic market without also fixing prices in the foreign market as 
well.  And vice versa.  That is the simple truth that formed the basis of the plaintiffs’ 
                                                 
42 Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2001). 
43 Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 426. 
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claims in Empagran.  In their interpretation of the FTAIA the Supreme Court and the 
D.C. Court of Appeals acknowledged that truth, but concluded that it did not bring the 
plaintiffs within the FTAIA exception. 
 
Building on arguments raised by Justice Scalia at oral argument, I have offered a sim-
ple—and very narrow—interpretation of the FTAIA exception.  It fills the gap created by 
Illinois Brick when the direct purchaser is a foreign entity and domestic indirect purchas-
ers face elevated prices.  Domestic effects do not “bring about” foreign injury, as plain-
tiffs argue.  Rather, domestic effects arise only if a substantial portion of the overcharge 
to foreign firms is passed on to their domestic customers. It should be clear that the for-
eign defendant’s exposure would be much less under this interpretation compared to the 
potential liability under the one market/arbitrage theories proposed by the Empagran 
plaintiffs.  Practically, with this interpretation most foreign claims against foreigners 
would be barred 
 
The FTAIA, under this interpretation, provides some possibility of relief while respecting 
a concern for international comity.  It would limit the foreign direct purchaser’s claims to 
those that have a substantial effect on the domestic market—that is, where a substantial 
portion of the overcharge is passed on to the domestic market.  If the foreign purchaser 
bore most or the entire overcharge, its claim properly would fall within the scope of for-
eign governments’ competition policy, not that of the United States.  If, on the other 
hand, the foreign purchaser resold a substantial portion of the overpriced goods into the 
domestic marketplace, causing a direct effect on domestic trade, the purchaser ought to 
have recourse in an American court.   
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